Jouissance\textsuperscript{1} in Lacan. Neither paradigms nor speculation.

Clinic and praxis

Introduction

One of the terms from the Lacanian clinic\textsuperscript{2} that has yielded the greatest of confusions, amid its common use by psychoanalysts, is the term Jouissance. Conceptual term belonging to the psychoanalytical discourse, it didn’t exist before the aforementioned discourse as such a clearly differentiated term in the classical binomial pleasure-displeasure. The matter begins in Freud with what he calls “pleasure principle”. It is attributed, from an economical point of view, to the unconscious processes. This should already foreshadow that it is not about the pleasure-displeasure as it is used in the motivation hedonistic theory started with Young\textsuperscript{3}.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1} Translator's Note: The original French term has been chosen due to the fact that it depicts the notion in a more appropriate manner.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{2} “Clinic” already means in psychoanalysis, like in other practices, a theorization of what happens, be it in the saying or in the acting but in the act in which they are exerted, even the answers they obtain.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{3} Who applies this characteristic to the stimuli in a way that they provide more to the psyche than just information from the exterior or the interior.}
Freud’s pleasure principle works not as a pleasure, but as a regulator. It tries for the thing-representations drawing from the memory traces, that are produced in their turn by perception signs, to not overflow the mental apparatus. The “energy” that comes from stimuli passes through the different filters and acts cathecting the different “representations”. That is to say, the pleasure principle is a never accomplished tendency in the same way as the preconscious tends towards the Reality principle. The pleasure principle is an economical companion of the perception identity sought by the Unconscious. Hence, they are two principles that produce two failed tendencies, albeit they regulate the movement of the entire framework.

One usually finds in literature that if there is an attempt to maintain pleasure inside of “homeostatic” parameters, it is because excess becomes displeasure. That is the doctrine underlying the first trauma theory; the excess of pleasure leads to obsession and paradoxically the lack of satisfaction to hysteria. What is usually not stated is that there is already an inclusion in these elaborations, without it being too obvious, of the idea that there is a previous process that is not governed by the aforesaid principle. This proves that this principle endeavors to introduce order. The beyond the pleasure
principle is present in Freud’s first theorizations. If one follows the Freudian path, it is common to introduce the beyond this principle through the masochism approach; however, it is not going to be followed here.

**Jouissance** or beyond the pleasure principle is already in Freud when he conceives drive. We can also find it in the first topographical and within the first process: the one that goes from perception signs to the Unconscious. Freud encounters many difficulties precisely when having to differentiate or locate drives in this first process. He encounters them because he doesn’t succeed in differing and articulating two types of representatives with precision. We refer to the path of thing-representations that seems unique: from perception signs to the traces and from these to the different **Vorstellungs**. He doesn’t achieve clearly differentiating it in a structural sense, although he does from a dynamic point of view, of the famous **Vorstellungsrepräsentaz**. The drive, representing in itself the organism in the Unconscious, has in Freudian mythology two representatives: the abovementioned **Vorstellungsrepräsentaz** and affect.

With affect Freud doesn’t engage to any confusion, it doesn’t belong to any topographical element, it freely runs through the entire mental apparatus in what he calls
“affect development”. On the other hand, with Vorstellungsrepräsentaz he does struggle and doesn’t correctly locate that, not only should they be in the Unconscious, but they should also go through the first process that we referred to earlier. Part of the difficulty derives from the insufficient doctrine about the body. That is, Freud only has the narcissistic body and it doesn’t go into the first topography. When he starts to constitute the second one in the mid-14’s to locate it, he has no other choice but to locate the drive in it, taking as the first object the “moi” and thus from it doing the object’s charges.

We insist, the fact of having a topography on the one hand and the other one on the other hand, Unconscious and narcissism, and that in either one the drive is duly located, results in his inability to differentiate jouissance’s body from the narcissistic body. In other words, Freud has two topographies and not three as we have pinpointed in other works: the topography of jouissance. The topography of jouissance interferes in the other two. In the first topography, it is represented by the Vorstellungsrepräsentaz, and in the second one, by Id’s silence.
The differentiation between the different bodies in Lacan’s work

Already from the start and with the Mirror Theory for narcissism, Lacan accomplishes to pave the path to locate the Freudian libido out of the unconscious order. Narcissism is articulated by the Unconscious but not just by it. We refer to the fact that between narcissism and the Unconscious there is the Phantasy and it is already also structured by the drive. The unconscious desire remains located in this Phantasy in a way that the libido stays, in the narcissism, differentiated from Freudian unconscious desire.

But, who articulated the fantasy? Only the Unconscious? No, the Unconscious and the drive.

Let us briefly return to Freud; according to him, we must not forget that the drive represents jouissance at the end of his work. The drive is the “beyond” of the life drives when the fundamental drive is the death drive, a transbiological beyond, according to Lacan. Hence, there is no libido within the death drive. Life drives are no longer the real drives. Or so we read it. Thus, the paradox lies in the fact that drives confer the jouissance as something transbiological and at the same time represent the body, albeit not
the body of life like in the case of narcissism—under which the organism beats—but the body of “death”. What is that body? *Freud thus finds himself in a crossroad:* the Unconscious follows the pleasure principle but what reaches it is *jouissance*. The question is immediate: is it everything of the same type? Is it the same *jouissance*, the one that comes from the thing-representations (plain signifiers in Lacan) and the one that reaches from the drive through the *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz*?

This subject traverses Lacan’s entire work, from which we treat some excerpts. In the Seminar of Psychoanalysis Ethics he locates the Real. A clear differentiation with the Imaginary, then, is the Real that governs the whole economic framework but beyond any signifier law. In other words, the signifier follows its “law”: the one belonging to the topological signifiers-chains; and the Real remains, although we don’t know what is Real. It is no longer the Real that can be symbolized and therefore “knowable” in

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4 The French term used by Lacan, "chaîne signifiante", is ambiguous in its translation. In fact, he refers to a chain formed by signifiers but that don’t mean anything in themselves, a chain that yields the significances. English translators grasp that difficulty and translate for "signifying chain." We opt for a literal translation that, although not linguistically appropriate, is theoretically more correct.
philosophy and science, but an impossible Real. This Real is the one that in a given moment can collude with the signifiers-chain and produces an intricate linking therein from its ex-sistence. To attain rigor in this, Lacan resorts to the Greek concept of Tyché. It is then the true “law” that moves the entire framework from the outside, which is why it is traumatic- because it is not a signifier, but it marks the signifier.

This concept will afterwards be developed with the term of “semblance”⁵ for the signifier in a way that the discourse “will not belong to the semblance” albeit there is no discourse that doesn’t and thus it shows that the first thesis is a denegation. That is, it is the Real, already named impossible in the Symbolic, the one that moves the discourse. The Real moves it in an attempt to write the sexual relationship but it can’t and so writes something else. It writes a signifier in a necessary way: $S_1$, and from them we will have to obtain the drive. It can also write what is contingent: the major signifiers; or even what is possible: the words (mots), which brings us back to the difference between thing-representation and word-representation in Freud that already showed that jouissances are diverse.

⁵ “Semblant” in French.
What remains important to be remembered is that one can write something from the Real, not from the body like in the Freudian drive. Inversely, the organism will bodilize itself with that which has been written from the Real. This is the fundamental change from Lacan to Freud.

We could say that this change begins in Lacan’s work with the way in which he conceives the Demand: the past necessity digitalized or discretized by the Other’s signifier. This had two problems. Firstly, that the Real was the necessity, what left yet the excessively linked connection to the biological and within the writable. Secondly, the signifiers deriving from the thing-representation remained, once more, imprecisely differentiated from the signifiers digitalizing necessity. These problems are greatly visualized in the speech and desire graph in the writing Subversion of the Subject … The asynchronized drive in the enunciation chain had to have a synchronous point, or inversely, from a synchronous point one could obtain the enunciation chain in its entirety. However, was the synchronous point then the Other of the Other? That it may not be that way must guide the entire framework and Lacan is extremely careful of it.

Lacan solves the first problem firstly never confusing Demand with drive; the drive is the
relationship of the divided subject, a relationship regarding cut (coupure), with the Demand. And he offers us an algebraic formula, which he doesn’t develop at this time, similar to the Phantasy one: $\sum D$. The second problem is more delicate due to the fact that the enunciation chain didn’t have to work as a metalanguage of the statement\textsuperscript{1}. Lacan saw this and that is why he shows that one must respond to the question in the statement floor but with “enunciation floor terms”. He couldn’t solve it until he built the four discourses. The second problem is more delicate due to the fact that the enunciation chain didn’t have to work as a metalanguage of the statement. Lacan saw this and that is why he shows that one must respond to the question in the statement floor but with “enunciation floor terms”. He couldn’t solve it until he built the four discourses. With them he separates the fields of the subject and the Other from the places occupied by the divided subject and the signifiers. Finally, the Other is just a field and not the speech place, it will be able to be the speech place when it contains the Knowledge. This way, as well, there is a more definite difference between the Other and the Unconscious, that was the relationship to the Other in the beginning and now it’s something else.

We have introduced Knowledge, that is, a group of articulated signifiers forming a system.
Then, the drive signifiers must not be the same than the ones belonging to the Knowledge. Now we must return to the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz. Lacan, similarly to how he modified the order in the Unconscious topography locating it on the preconscious, will change the use of Freudian Vorstellungsrepräsentanz. This change he makes in the Seminar XI when he shows that: “as much as it may surprise you, the binary signifier is the one that furnishes the Unconscious with knowledge: the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz”. In other words, it’s not the one representing drive.

To make this change effective, he has had to differentiate the two definitions for “representation”, that in German are written differently but in their translation to Spanish they blend. The representation in the classical sense, “what it represents” through signs, signals, etc., is the Vorstellung, which must be distinguished from the one to the other representation, the repräsentanz. If you wish to understand it differently, the Vorstellung represents what isn’t there\(^6\). On the other hand, repräsentieren represents one in front of another, or the two elements being present\(^7\).

\(^6\) This is why it is usually theorized with a bar that vertically separates the representative from the represented.
\(^7\) Hence, Lacan uses a horizontal arrow.
**The construction of the drive**

Lacan finds himself, now that he has built the unary and binary signifiers, with the possibility that one represents the subject for the other one. It is his modification, for the signifier theory, of Peirce’s excellent definition of the sign. He articulated in an only definition both the vertical representation – the sign represents something (an object in logics), representing it horizontally for another sign named *representamen*. Lacan modifies this definition using only signifiers. Consequently, the signifier doesn’t represent an object but a subject for another signifier, which never represents this subject.  

Then, what does this second signifier represent? Well, the representation. This means that at the chains of signifiers’ level, when they copulate, or when the discourses are structured as the copulation point, a chain without a subject (acephalic) can represent the subject for another chain representing the

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8 To finally put an end once and for all to the first definition for signifier, in which the subject was under any signifier, due to the fact that a signifier was the difference with another signifier. This first definition is secondary and is minimally useful for the Knowledge or for the Swarm, but isn’t useful for our subject and our object. Lacan offers this new definition in the beginnings of *Seminar XII*. 
entire representation through the Knowledge. It represents all the representing capacity in the objective sense of the term. What type is this last representation? This representation, obviously, is the object @. As an object it represents as logics and mathematics do. Or, an “objectal” representative of the thing that isn’t a trace. Depending on the situation, it represents a Real lost, the specular non-difference, what the Other desires or enjoys⁹, etc. At the beginning of Lacan’s work, the object @ represents, partially, a “Das Ding”.

This is why Lacan theorizes the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz as the Knowledge of the Unconscious. It is the objectal representation (it remains to be studied) that is represented in the copulation between the fields belonging to the subject and to the Other, or within the signifier-chain formula, $(S_1(S_1(S_1\ldots \rightarrow S_2)))$, by a set of signifiers called Knowledge¹⁰.

This has already been produced by art, where this painter’s Knowledge is articulated with the representation objects; Lacan simply improves it. Furthermore, the formula $S_2/\text{apresents us a relationship that in psychoanalysis replaces the concept theorized}

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⁹ Jouissance

¹⁰ A representation, corresponding to an object, is represented by another representation in the signifier-chain.
by logics: \textit{Ser.} / \textit{Sed.} / \textit{object} – \textit{referent}. In it, based on the trine sign, a signifier represents a concept that traps an object belonging to the discourse universe. It traps the object that makes the concept true. Lacan eliminates the concept and locates the divided subject, as well as he directly articulates Knowledge and object if such is the case. This is why he uses the \textit{Vorstellungsrepräsentanz} for the Unconscious. On the other hand, he produces the $S_1$ for them to be the ones to represent the subject but only if they copulate with the aforementioned Knowledge. If this doesn’t happen, we obtain “the death of the subject” in psychosis.

Now we understand that if there are two types of signifiers and an object with several sides as well, we will then have diverse \textit{jouissances}. The \textit{jouissance} body becomes the organism bodilized by the One signifiers, or signifiers that mark the body\textsuperscript{ii}.

Then this organism bodilized by the signifier, and not imaginarized by narcissism, remains at total disposition of what Lacan calls enjoying substance\textsuperscript{11}, that we understand as something fairly better elaborated than what Merleau Ponty called the meat: an organism already marked by the signifier. In that sense, one must never confuse \textit{jouissance} with the Real,

\textsuperscript{11} “Substance jouissante” in French.
with the exception for the time being of the narcissistic jouissance, there is jouissance because there is a signifier\textsuperscript{12}.

We can again go back to the drive formula and show that a series of operations, of the type boundaries in signifiers-chains linked to the privation operation, must create a c-boundary\textsuperscript{13} in the triangularized torus called erogenous zone. This is where the most complicated matter appears: something that remains metonymical to the body but that is no longer in the body and that Lacan names the incorporeal: the object @.

It is an object that is in the Other’s field, therefore it is no longer our own or autoerotic but it is linked to the own body through the erogenous zone. If this is accomplished, what Freud presents as a myth, the drive, has been built. That is, the body drains jouissance via the drive, in order to not be excessively enjoyed, and this occurs thanks to the c-boundary of the erogenous zone and the incorporeal object, an object that

\textsuperscript{12} Something that can be read inversely, due to the fact that there is a signifier and if there was another jouissance it would no longer exist. Therefore, we don’t know any longer if it is lost, but the superego forges the belief that it can be found.

\textsuperscript{13} A c-boundary doesn’t imply a hole, due to the fact that it can be eliminated if such were the case. On the other hand, an edge that insists called i-boundary does imply a hole.
topologically doesn’t belong to the own body but is taken as our own\textsuperscript{14}, and that is located in the Other’s body. Topology exists here to help us through the two interlaced tori.

Hence, the “drive” \textit{jouissance} is both belonging to the signifier and the surplus-\textit{jouissance} as an object. It is a \textit{jouissance} called asexuated because it doesn’t distinguish its sexual side from the other one. It is a \textit{de plus jouissance} where we know that the sexual relationship, for its inability to be written, presents us an impossible \textit{jouissance}.

\textsuperscript{14} Similarly to the libido as an organ in the mirror topography. The object @ doesn’t belong to the subject’s body but is articulated with it and at the same time belongs to the Other’s field. It is cut out in the Other. The question is, whose is it? And the answer is that it belongs to the subject insofar it is related to drive. It’s what Lacan called, at the beginning of his work, finding a place within the drive. In the opposite case, it would be a danger for the subject, as Freud ascertained.
On the other hand, the Unconscious’ Knowledge confers the capacity to represent what we have named object representation\(^{15}\), a representation that remains to be studied but that art and mathematics have extensively discussed. The same difficulty always arises in clinic, knowing when something is a signifier or an object. This double articulation between the object @ on the drive side with the object @ on the representation side is the area in which Lacan always conceived the connection between the drive and the Unconscious, “for its boundary topology” \(^{11}\). Clearly, it is not going to be due to the divided subject, it is more likely its consequence. This is why Lacan said that desire divides the subject and the drive divides desire\(^ {16}\). The Unconscious’ Knowledge will also introduce its own jouissance: knowledge enjoys in its acquisition as it does in its execution.

We now fully understand that the holophrasal disorders, in the copulation point of the two types of signifiers, produce the mental weakness or psychosomatics, depending on whether the divided subject-object @ link is on one side or the other. That is, if it is on the subject’s body’s side, the incorporeal is lost and the erogenous zone “enjoys itself” as

\(^{15}\) That Lacan names the representation’s representative in the Phantasy in the 1966 note added to the The Preliminary Question… Writing.

\(^{16}\) Freud’s Del Triebe and The Analyst’s Desire Writing.
Freud conceived it for what we today call PSP. In other words, the phantasmatic articulation is lost. Contrarily, if it is on the Other’s side, the subject-Knowledge articulation is lost in this point, in a way that the subject remains without a Knowledge different from its drive, what turns him into “an idiot”, as one can only be taught or instructed “to the extent of their Knowledge” and then Knowledge is entirely possessed by the Other, who himself and never the subject enjoys this Knowledge.

The jouissance outside of the body

Once located the jouissance body, we must turn to the jouissance linked to the significance. Lacan showed that the drive was the calling for the Other; he did this to differentiate from the narcissistic jouissance the one already located in the Word (Parole). We must distinguish significance and body. The significance, that we presume to be regulated by the phallic signifier, means something more than discourses, it means the Word (Parole) and the Word can be articulated with them in what was initially called full word. For the full word to be, the signification topography must exist: the signifier acting on the signified. More precisely, the discourses would be acting on the signified. Always bearing in mind that the signified is already formed by signifiers although not
topologically chained; however, that is where “thelanguage” must be located, the new structure to be rigorized.

When the full word is extended to the new concept of the saying, it produces two effects, one of signification and another one of sense. Each one will have its own economic aspect; the signification will be the phallic jouissance that then stays in the mental apparatus outside of the body, albeit with effects upon it. Contrarily, the sense presents a difficulty. There is no sense without “thelanguage” structure resource, but on the other hand Lacan depicts the jouissance-sense chains to us. How must this be understood?

We have no other choice but to locate “thelanguage” between the Symbolic and the Imaginary, where Lacan locates the sense, and the signification between the Symbolic and the Real in the same manner that he does it. This

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18 That includes the full Word and what is written within the Word act.
19 However, this accepts an exception. The phallic signifier in its simple incarnation as a signifier can be bodilized, be it in the penis or in the clitoris, in a way that one should never confuse the aforementioned jouissance (the idiot’s, according to Lacan) with the phallic function’s jouissance when it acts as a signifying apparatus.
way, concepts and jouissances are clarified to us. The jouissance-sense is established in the signifiers-chains but knotted with the Imaginary order. By doing this, Lacan follows Saussure’s line of the articulation between signifiers and images, only he adds the sense, which in the Language is an extra-linguistic effect, so that it supports itself with rhetoric and not syntax, even though this last one is a limit that provides evidence for a Real, as he shows in the “Television” Written Other. That is, the crystallized metaphors that form the lexicon (metonymical treasure) yield “Thelanguage”’s sense but within the metaphor and metonymy operation, as rhetoric figures, they produce that sense effect beyond the semantics affirmed in syntax. And insofar that sense is produced in the statement floor it will be able to join the jouissance in the jouissance-sense. Such jouissance isn’t mitigated without the non-sense, as the symptom requires for its dissolution. The non-sense is the form of loss in front of one of the impossible and it’s what fails to appear in the flight of ideas. It’s not a matter of the sense that flees, but more likely it is the non-sense which is not located as one of the impossible with which the subject must stumble upon, and whose consequence is that all speech is without sense, lacking sense\textsuperscript{20}.

\textsuperscript{20} Analogously to the signification that doesn’t find the signifier corresponding to a loss in the Other and as a consequence all signification is holed.
However, signification also stumbles upon an impossible. A signification alludes to another one, said Lacan at the beginning. After, he locates it as an impossible next to the sense and the sex in the L’étourdit Written Other. About sex, we have already proved the aforementioned impossible and with sense as well. Let’s see now the impossibility of the signification. Let us regard signification as standing for denotation\textsuperscript{21} from this moment onwards.

The phallic signification is a jouissance regulator, given the fact that it applies signifiers upon signifiers taken as point in the compact, bounded, and closed jouissance space. The impossible with whom it finds itself is that it can’t fully write a phallic jouissance. This is why the phallic function must have exceptions. The sexuation formulas are gaps in the phallic jouissance. In other words, the subject that must locate itself in one of the sexuated sides, at least from a

\textsuperscript{21} We believe that the mess regarding the Bedeutung concept when translated to Spanish is solved using signification, not like Lacan does so, but with the offering sense and denotation double effect. In Spanish, to mean has both meanings. Then why not maintaining the effect sense and the denotation effect and thus avoid further complication, also bearing in mind that in Lacan it is sense and signification. Accordingly, the signification point will refer, depending on the given case, to an effect or another one or both at the same time.
jouissance point of view, can’t do so with the drive or with the sense. It must do so with its Unconscious, taking the Unconscious in its most minimal definition, the signification or denotation of the given side. Then it tries to do so with an impossible denotation. In the same way as it finds the impossible of the barred Other to give itself a name, now it finds a jouissance that escapes the signifier, a jouissance about which it will not be able to say anything.

If the drive was the Real written within the Symbolic, now the path is inversed, it is the Symbolic that, in its attempt to phallicize everything, comes across an impossible. There is a jouissance that won’t allow significance or denotation although it does permit location. When we take a closer look, the sexuation formulas contain two distinct negations, the one that denies the phallic “predicate” and the one that denies the quantifiers. Then, only some formulas, in order to locate the exterior to the phallic function, send the jouissance to the object @, that is, outside of the signifier but preserved within the Other’s letterification, and some other formulas send to the Real. But they don’t send to the pure Real, as in it we don’t know if one can presume a Knowledge or a jouissance. They send to an imaginarization of


\[\text{Letter as groups and consequently within the representation as we have argued above.}\]
the Real. Not an imaginarization mediated by the Symbolic, this is the difference with the narcissism imaginarization that is, in fact, mediated in such a manner.

Summarizing, we have the narcissist jouissance linked to the narcissistic body, we have the “drive” jouissance or the one belonging to the S₁ linked to the jouissance body. We have the jouissance of what is incorporeal that the Other’s body can symbolize if it is conveniently letterfied. We have the jouissance of Knowledge linked to the Unconscious. We have two more elaborate jouissances: the one belonging to the sense and the one belonging to the denotation. Finally, we have the so called Other Jouissance.

Then, if one must locate a jouissance beyond the Other, both tori are no longer useful, with the possibility of knotting the three in a Borromean fashion as a solution. But it can’t be a third signifier torus, as we would have unexpectedly introduced the Other’s Other. Also, we must be able to locate what we have showed about jouissance sense and denotation’s sense. Then the three tori will no longer be the one of the subject’s field and of the Other’s field, but they will be the three RSI orders.
In the chain-knot we locate the different *jouissances* through surfaces that are located with the orders’ support. Between R and I, we locate the Other *jouissance*. Between S and I, we locate the sense. Between S and R, we locate the phallic *jouissance*. In the center, we locate the object.

With the chain-knot we can locate the sense *jouissance*, the surplus-*jouissance*, the phallic *jouissance*, but we can’t locate the $S_1$ *jouissance* or the narcissistic *jouissance*. 

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What is happening? That we are in lack of the subjectivity, what represents the subject for the whole structure. To introduce it there are two ways, one is to locate a fourth Knot that goes though the three orders chain-knot that are still knotted in three knots in a Borromean fashion. If we chose this way, we have the subject of the paranoiac personality.

The big jump is to introduce a fourth knot that represents the subject but that will be knotted in a Borromean fashion to four with the other three. Such subjectivity will be maintained by the so-called sinthome, which must never be confused with the symptom, as this last one is a consequence of the impossible that the first one encounters. We will thus have the possibility to locate the $S_1$’s path, the narcissistic jouissance of the mirror topography on the side of the Other’s jouissance. As well as the super-ego on the side of the phallic jouissance, and at the center of the structure there won’t be the object’s jouissance but a void with the object @ next to it.
When Miller’s orientation argues that the enunciation floor is the one “that treats” the statement floor it commits to the same mistake, no matter how much it tries to correct it with the $S(A)$. This question must never be confused with the failed metalanguage between the two signifiers-chains and the signified one that, supported if such is the case by the phallic signifier $\Phi$, is questioned by $S(A)$.

This is topologized through the so-called torus triangularization. Each signifier takes the shape of a small triangle in its extension. That is the body’s jouissance, radically distinct from the so-called narcissistic jouissance that takes place without the signifier. The narcissistic jouissance is the image’s and the body’s jouissance that doesn’t pass through the signifier. This is what the transvestite shows when he
presents it, pathetically confounded with woman’s jouissance, which doesn’t stop certain neurotic or perverse individuals from believing they can find there the uttermost from the phallic mother’s jouissance.

It will be the mirror topography with its non-specular objects, due to the fact they aren’t orientable, the one that will offer a supporting image for libido to the aforementioned object called petit @. It is the link between the drive and narcissism that Freud looked for in the year 1914.